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Abstract: Out of a sense of nationhood or out of mere circumstantial and specific references to a 
national context, it is altogether visible that anti-universalist debate is making headway in 
international relations, in cultural studies and in the political science, if we are to classify a broader 
consultation of events. This article aims at presenting how the Western ideas can be seen in 
examination, as artificial structures, in the national context of Asia. The Asian Values are a very 
interesting evaluative specimen of the anti-universalist orations. In the case of many Asian states, they 
created settled forms of government, having a special adaptation with the originating incidents that 
were their birthplace. With the inward of these units of contextualization, we will turn to the conferral 
of the Singapore democracy model and to its German block and bond with the Asian Values. We will 
interrelate a personal conspectus regarding the correctness of the seal of fastening between the Asian 
Values and Singapore’s democracy model. 
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1. The Asian Values` Diorama 
The Asian Values are an exhibition of the nisus of perseverance of some Asian 
states in trying to scale a firewall against the world’s interconnectedness and the 
negative homogenizing effects of globalization1. They are resistant to them, yet 
they do not aim at the same tendency of thrusting out. They do not aim to use the 
same checking and adjusting with the same global marks. They pine for flattened 
environmental conditions of growth and ambience. They do not propose a system 
                                                    
1
 In the terms of reference of this article, we use the term of globalization in order to denote the 
intensification, to a world-scale, of ideas, of Western origin, of how inter-state relations need to be 
conducted and regularized and how the exploration and development of inter-state relations need to 
be fulfilled by implements.  
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that can be comfortable to all countries, but rather a system that can impact the 
circle of acquaintances, only for Asian countries.  
From this side-view, Western Values have been shepherded by an agreement of the 
few. They cannot represent an item of collective solicitation for all the states on the 
global arena, since not all the states took part in their ontogenesis. 
Representatively, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was not an 
emanation of all the countries in the world. Then, if the participation at its drafting 
was not unanimous, how can each and every state in the world esteem and venerate 
its provisions as a moral and impartial ordinance? Some states may feel that, since 
they could not affirm a stance in the fashioning of the democratic principles, of the 
respect for human rights and civil liberties, then why are they expected to field 
the same manufacture in their own domestic environ? The virtue and quality of the 
Asian Values discourse is that these values are anti-universal in pith and meaning. 
The Asian Values take the airfoil from a de-colonized Asian continent, a continent 
which suffered from the neediness of self-rule and determination1. They reproduce 
the conceptual breed of an Asia by Asians, an Asia created by the regional 
governments and not by extrinsic actors: 
“[…] Asian values2 are the cultural orientations, beliefs, norms, or attitudes unique 
to the Asian region that form the base of their political, economic, and cultural 
institutions and processes [...]. Notably, Asian Values are themselves multifaceted 
norms, and thus it is very common in the literature to mention more than one trait 
when defining Asian Values”. (Young, 2010)  
Asian Values are a genotype of Asia and plunk for Asian particularity, despite the 
fact that they cannot be settled in a casing of some sort or another. The Asian 
countries have very different cultures and civilizations, or different construing of 
the same culture and/or civilization3. Then, how can a surety be pledged among all 
the Asian Values, so that some recurrence can be envisioned between them? After 
all, they affirm that they reside for a genotype of Asian thinking4. This genotype 
would include, in a very capacious manner: the importance of collective reasoning 
                                                    
1
 The shaping of colonialism fathered the generation of the endogenous principles of inter-state 
encounters and of how they should be managed. 
2
 For this passage, the author chose to use the bold and italics for the syntagm of Asian Values; 
Likewise, the word values is written, with a capital letter, by the author`s choosing; They did not 
appear in this form in the original text. 
3
 Depending on how the cultural centerpieces were obtained and taken up all around Asia.  
4
 We used this sneer of verbalism in order to underline the fact that the genetic constitution of the 
Asian Values emerged from the loyalty to cultural relativism.  
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and of making decisions preferably within a congregated assembly, a penchant for 
hierarchy - as the most efficient ordering principle, both in society and in public 
affairs, a druthers for consensualism as a method of decision-making, instead of 
the more discordant manners of majority ruling1, the confirmation of the familial 
setting as the most important collective organism2, the propound for informalism 
as an authoritative tenet for engagements, both inter-state and inter-personal3. If 
such all-embracing concepts take on a habitual acknowledgement, it is not a slight 
and strained idea that others will issue in accordance.  
 
2. The Mutiny between the Singapore Democracy Model and Asian 
Values 
The master narratives of the Singapore Democracy Model have to be met with the 
attendant of the computations of its old days and, particularly, of the earnest 
inquiries of how Singapore envisioned its state-building amidst the queer accents 
of the post-War period. Like any other state in Southeast Asia, Singapore had to go 
through a grossly unconventional environment of foiling and scupper. The 
conditions were invert – a commonality that all the Southeast Asian states had to 
experience4. On the back of the envelope of these conditions, there stood 
Singapore’s ticket for statehood and independent action5. If we are to reply to the 
major scientific contributions regarding Malay history6, we have to admit that the 
                                                    
1
 Even if the majority decides, there is always a minority which can never find enough compensation 
and compliance for the decision adopted; If the majority ruling is taken by a weak or a very fragile 
majority, then it is likely that the indemnifications of the decision would be even fewer and points of 
disparity would sooner or later disunite the grouping; Against this kind of outcome, the Asian Values 
present for consideration consensual decision-making. 
2
 The relations within the state or within the society have to function as the relations within a family, 
with the same respectful ascribing.  
3
 Formalism is thought to be a corsair of inter-personal and inter-state relations; If the agreements 
adopted would require a formal pout, then the trust between the participating parties is barren of 
actual meaning. 
4
 Certainly, variations can be drawn; Some experienced this situation more than others; For instance, 
the Indochinese states had to make their entrance on the global scene, by opposing the continuous 
liaise intercession of the French neo-colonialism; Indonesia was, also, not a sleight-of-hand 
performer in confronting outer forms of suppression: the Dutch neo-colonialism tried desperately to 
reignite its left-over flickers.  
5
 Independence, for Singapore, would share some of the padded edges that Malaysia`s independence 
had: independence of a very unusual nature; Each and every Southeast Asian state has a very different 
account of the method used to achieve its independence; In the case of Malaysia, independence was 
achieved, by bits and pieces within almost the same pattern.  
6
 Comprising, for some years, Singapore`s history.  
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Malay people did not seal the same the same convulsing nature against the 
extraneous elements, of European extraction, as Indonesia did. The egress of 
British dominion in the Malay territories was enacted by the agreements of 1867, 
when the territories became parts of the British colonial possessions in Asia, 
alongside India1. These security arrangements transformed the Malayan territories 
into protected parts of the British Empire.  
The historical connection between Singapore and the Malayan territories was a 
convivial one, at least up to a point. The slight shelter of closeness was 
implemented by the desire of the British to prognosticate their hold on the colonial 
possessions as much as possible. The final bearing of a centralized administration 
in the colonies was the trigger-factor, and not, the territories` readiness to achieve 
unification.  
The British offered abutment for the creation of the Federation of Malaya after 
World War II. In 1948, the federation was given entailment. Only in 1957, the 
federation achieved the total dislocation from British interfering and became self-
directed. Riddled with points of reference to Malaya2, at first Singapore was 
excluded from the creative process of the federation. The changing mindset 
occurred in 1963, when Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak gained an official 
admission in the federation. The entrance was quickly accompanied by noisy 
collisions and clanging between the Singapore concept of state-building and the 
bulk of Malayan plurality. The grounds of the resulting clangor can be explained 
by multiple elements that agree with each other in derivation and applied 
significance. 
Singapore had to overcome, throughout its history, a residuum of demographic 
changes, buttressed by the British colonial rule. The British colonists supported the 
borderless movements of large masses of people, in and out their colonial 
                                                    
1
 The Southeast Asian tableland was, actually, a criss-cross game among the world`s major powers; In 
the case of the Malayan territories, Great Britain and Holland disputed with alacrity the opportunity 
for control; At first, perhaps, the aim was not total control; Their disputations were terminated 
through the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, which placed the Northern parts of the Malayan territories 
under British Rule; Certainly, India had a very different heap of store, compared to the Malayan 
territories, as far as the British conception of exploitation and domination was concerned; The 
imposition of colonial rule in the Malayan territories and in India was based on a quasi-chronological 
coincidence, as the British rule was introduced in India in 1858, while the Malayan territories became 
over-flown with British control, ever since the decision to place them under the administration of the 
British Colonial Office in 1867; When India no longer represented a picket for the British running 
costs, the Malayan territories gained a whole new significance.  
2
 Especially, in terms of culture.  
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possessions. This approach was given an official form of address, as: unlimited 
immigration. This would forever curb and remodel the ethnic balances of 
Singapore’s population1. A concourse of many ethnic groups settled in Singapore, 
opening businesses and creating a life of their own, while trying to mix and join 
with the aboriginal people2. The largest mass of these ethnic groups was the 
Chinese one. Singapore very rapidly, became a Chinese island in a Malay 
Peninsula, if taking into account the demographic considerations. On the 16th of 
September 1963, when Singapore entered the Federation of Malaya, it was clear 
that the smoldering encounters of opinion would be taking place. The wormwood 
of discontent was beginning to sow. Singapore could not agree to betray its rather 
socialist whereabouts in the public spheres of policy-making. Its ideas did not 
receive the basic valuation needed for mutuality to surface. Consequently, the 
umbilical cord between Singapore and Malaya was cut off on the 9th of August 
19653. The expression of national humiliation and of treachery – as conceived by 
Singapore’s leaders - did not go away without expressage. These historical books 
of facts are extremely important to understand the Singapore model of democracy 
and how it is replicated in security doctrines for the island-state.  
Becoming only a small tip of the Malay Peninsula, Singapore used the testimonial 
of strategic helplessness, in order to formulate its political regime and the follow-in 
security strategies4. As Seng See Tan and Alvin Chew explain: 
“[the] newly independent Singapore, cast adrift from its hinterland moorings 
following an unceremonious expulsion from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, 
adopted the pugnacious image of a “poison shrimp”--small, not invulnerable, but 
certainly no pushover”. (Seng, & Chew, 2008) 
Singapore started searching for the maximum leverage it could find in order to 
secure its statehood, both internally and externally. This search would continue 
undisrupted and would be characterized by the feeling, method and measure of 
uttermost protection, by a pure and straight we feeling. Within the circumference of 
                                                    
1
 Like in the case of other Southeast Asian states, demography affixed a permanent engraving of the 
country`s destiny; Other references can be given, by inferring the separatist movements in Western 
Papua (Indonesia), or in Mindanao (Philippines). 
2
 These shifts were predominantly noticeable between 1890 and 1920.  
3
 The Malayan leaders could not iron securely a place, within the federation, for Singapore. 
4
 The sense of a state destitute of help and of strength would continue to be a matter of constant 
cropping in Singapore`s self-delivered national portrayals.  
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this chronic protectiveness, we must understand the underlying principles of the 
Singapore democracy model. 
The Singapore democracy model is not a framework which refuses to settle down 
any determination. Compared, for example, with the Malaysian democracy model, 
it is a particular version, a product manufactured to bear some resemblance with 
other ways of molding democratic principles, but which assumes different values, 
constructed for the purpose to give some representing relations between the state of 
Singapore and other Southeast Asian states. Indeed, Singapore was able to create 
its own style of democracy, by introducing some principles, worthy of imitation 
and by giving them unlike features within the national context. These 
circumstances may have created a sense of sundry-like occasions for 
implementation. If our assertions may sound too assorted from a conventional 
characterization, then how can the Singapore democracy model be characterized? 
How unconnected is it with the familiarities of Confucianism? Is it delirious for a 
unique experimental value? Does it have a judicious infirmity to a socialist 
appertaining? How many questions referring to the socialist discourse regarding 
democracy does it have? How guilty can it be found for the landing on socialist 
principles?  
There is some probity, as far as the Singapore democracy model is concerned, 
which is scheduled in transportation. It is quite hard to divide the quintessential, 
original products of the Singapore democracy model, from the ones which were 
added proportionally from other sources. The historical parameters that were 
introduced in the beginning may offer us some explanations1. They gave the 
Singapore democracy model an important face and voice for the collection of the 
principles contoured within the temporal progressions of statehood.  
                                                    
1Democracy – in Singapore`s pouts and statements – has to be, first of all, explained by a 
consanguinity with the historical facts; The point of departure of Singapore`s history as a modern 
nation and as an independent state, marked the beginning of  the prospection and of the development 
of the regime that the new state chose to implement; For the first time in its history, after the 
secession with Malaysia, Singapore could use the political freedom it had to ramp up and accumulate 
principles of statecraft that were best applicable; It all started out as an experiment; It is the author`s 
creed that Singapore, of all the Southeast Asian states, had and still has the best availability to 
reinvent; This is why the ideology and approach of the founding fathers of the nation could have 
suffered important divagations in the future, or it could have altered drastically, if the grounds for 
effectuation were not that fertile.  
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The assizes of Singapore’s statehood and, in the lines of consequence, of its 
democracy model, were a combination of factors. First of all, it was the need for 
security recovery and the sense of perpetual invulnerability1.  
Singapore was hallowed by the discourtesy made to it by Malaysia and also by the 
fact that it had to train itself against the impudence of other states, too. The flashier 
the security dilemma got, the biggest the challenge! The legitimacy of the new 
rulers and their continuance would have to create a natural appreciation among its 
citizens for being part of a collective structure. In this way, perceiving changes 
would occur in a manner less shaky and less instinctively hostile. It was a sound 
practical judgment of those in charge with the leadership of the country. 
At the time, the cognition of danger, as far as the regional leaders were concerned, 
came from China. The habits of speculation revolved around Chinese actions in the 
region: what could China do next, in order to impose Communism and disperse it 
in Southeast Asia? Singapore was a state with a large Chinese population and, 
naturally, the atmosphere of distrust, had permeated its regional standing and 
reputation. Having been too riddled with the copious accusations that it can 
become the next regional outpost for China to export its model of communism, 
Singapore began a campaign to create a trademark of a multi-ethnic, multi-
civilization state. In order to proclaim ownership of such an approach, Singapore’s 
leaders became influential followers of the ideas of communitarianism – a view 
upon which harmony can be instilled among different groups in society, based on 
the conventional rituals of tolerance, understanding and acceptance. 
The medium of making these underpinnings a reality would eventualy lead to the 
loss of individuality and total free spirit. An individual would have to create a place 
for itself, by accepting others and by working with others for the higher value of 
common good. Common good refers to collectivity, both in spirit, reflexive 
thinking and in action. Each individual can become the custodian of the other, if 
the other does not and cannot procure the means to achieve his/her goals and ideas 
in life. The state is the ultimate protector! The adherence to the conventions of the 
                                                    
1
 This trait is one that most analysts think it has still major prevalence nowadays; In the beginning of 
its independent history, Singapore`s answers to the security environment of the region, were thought 
to be highly affective, given by a state prepared to experience in anticipation external dangers, which 
could subside with its virtual elimination.  
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use of force can be put into practice only by the state, especially if the individuals 
prove to be unsuccessful at the endeavors of acting for their own good1. 
Singapore could not have avoided the omission of the importations of the ideas of 
communitarianism, on the Chinese Confucian branch. The Confucian values did 
not pretermit the values of filial piety2, the need to mend the societal pathologies 
inferred by the lack of order and coordination in society and by the establishment 
of five different types of hierarchy: ruler-ruled, husband-wife, parent-child, elder 
brother – younger brother, friend-friend. As Rachel Mc Devitt underlines:  
“The teachings of Confucius advocated behavior that showed obedience and 
respect for superiors, be they elder family members, ancestors, or leaders. 
Confucius believed that humans are inherently social beings.” (Devitt, 2007)3  
The maintenance of hierarchy is achievable only if virtue – or ren – is preserved. A 
leader has to offer to the others exemplar guidance and a moral compass in attitude 
and behavior. He can make others resort to acts of inner reformation, only if this is 
executed firstly by himself, within his own life and social interactions. Leadership 
cannot be questioned, by all means if ren is constantly ensured observance to, by 
all the members of society, especially by the leader. 
Confucianism represented a potent source of knowledge and legitimacy for the 
Singapore leaders. Its reconsiderations were not actually embraced by the leaders 
as any vitiating act would bring with it an undermining of the state’s ability to 
interfere in the private spheres of citizenship and secluded areas of the individuals` 
life. Another very important refining of the Confucian thought was brought on by 
Mengzi – one of the followers of Confucius4. The equilibrium in the societal order 
is not a thing which can be kept on by the people’s relationship of intimacy with 
the decisions made by the political conductors of social norms. The people are not 
absentees from the pitch contour of the social order: 
                                                    
1
 The preservation from loss and injury can be enacted by the state if it so choses and given the 
appropriate circumstances.  
2
 Which means the reverence towards one`s elders and the duty to manifest utter devotement to one`s 
elders, by giving them the appropriate respect and, at times, protection. 
3
 http://www.asian-studies.org/EAA/Confucianism_Handouts.pdf, Accessed on 15th of May 2013, 
23:44 p.m. 
4
 Mencius kept on with Confucius` teachings and also masterminded the important servicing aim of 
the leadership; The imperative that the people come first introduces the imperative of an hierarchy 
plateful by the popular consent; In other words, the popular support of a political leadership can 
ensure ren.  
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“Mengzi is generally acknowledged to be the most creative and influential follower 
of Kongzi (Confucius, 551-479 BCE), born about one hundred years after Kongzi's 
death. [...]Mengzi argued that the political legitimacy of a government derives 
from the acceptance or consent of the people. He stated clearly that the people may 
always justly overthrow a ruler who harms them”. (Doran, 2010)1 
In the post-colonial setting, Singapore tried to give implementation of these 
principles, but without drawing up any indictment against the leadership of the 
nation. A small-sized, encirclement-prone state, Singapore could not afford 
allowing the scheduling of people’s lack of satisfaction to appear and fester. 
Singapore had to create the institutional vehicles for the departure of those security 
arrangements most appropriate, for not being engulfed into the regional conflicts, 
fermenting during the harshest periods of the Cold War. To put it in another way, 
Singapore had to create the means of a journey already begun.  
The question was how to supply not just any means, but the desired means for its 
statehood. Indonesia developed its national resilience – ketahanan nasional2. 
What and how could Singapore use as a frame for the inescapable relation between 
the political leadership and the political leadership’s buyer and protection of 
people’s interests and actions?  
We have to remember the fact that Singapore did not benefit from the same 
material grist of another Southeast Asian state, comparable in size and 
geographical stretch: Brunei. Singapore did not enjoy the same concentration of 
resources that Brunei had3. Nor was Singapore privileged with the British 
protection sensor that Singapore was bestowed upon. It had to stretch more its 
craftsmanship as far as its state-building ability is concerned. The break between 
Singapore and the Federation of Malaya was brought in, mostly, by ethnic dissent4. 
The small piece of land, located in the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula would 
                                                    
1
 The author of this article provides a thorough contemplation of Dr. Lim Boon Keng – a Singapore 
enlightened intellectual personality, born in a family of expats from Malaya, of Chinese descent; 
Christine Doran utilizes his work in order to draw a portrayal of the Confucian principles, through the 
prism of one of the most specialized connoisseurs; Dr. Lim, in his explanations of the Confucian 
principles, correlated with the art of conducting state affairs, makes the comprehensive link between 
the Mencian definition of the people`s right to rebel and John Locke`s concept of revolution; 
People`s rebellion is an auxiliary mechanism for ren to prevail. 
2
 A concept born out of its longing for bargaining a regional influence, with the need to fight all forms 
of outside pressure: neocolonial or even regional, if the need will arise.  
3
 With special emphasis on energy resources.  
4
 The uncompromising relation between the Chinese and the Malay. 
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prove to be a very interesting mix between the Oriental elements and the Western 
ones. Just as Seng See Tan and Alvin Chew have demonstrated, Singapore was 
determined to prove its exceptional nature and the fact that it, undeservedly, was 
considered a pariah1: 
“Singapore's leaders were interested not only in surviving external attacks, but 
also winning over the enemy. “We are not just a poisonous shrimp”, as Lee Hsien 
Loong noted in 1984, “We do not go on the basis that if somebody attacks us, we 
will hit them and will hurt them. But we will go on the basis that we will hit them 
and we will be around to pick up the pieces at the end.” (Tan & Chew, 2008)2 
If one could take the overbearing generalization – that all island states have always 
displayed a practice of dissent – to be true, then this could easily be the most 
methodical manner to explain Singapore’s actions and why it was ousted from a 
federation where it wished to belong to, as it represented the uttermost fall-back 
arrangement, in terms of security. However, the explanations of Singapore’s 
actions and of its adjudications to introduce a model of democracy, with a 
Confucian intake, have also to be coupled with explanations of the Singapore’s 
constitutional bodily structure, in order to be the most effective. Confucianism can 
explain the irregularities from the liberal democracy model, but it cannot explain 
the irregularities from the fineness of Asian Values. 
The roots of the constitutional model led in by Singapore can be ferreted out by the 
specific traits of the Westminster model3. Singapore has set up a paradigm of 
parliamentary democracy. While the system is unicameral, the position of 
President is only a position required by the ritualistic protocol. The President’s 
areas of decision are very narrow, indeed4. The position of President is an elective 
one, with the popular legitimacy attributed to its constitutional standing.  
The members of the Parliament are selected through a very controversial system: 
they are either elected or nominated. For those who are nominated, their 
                                                    
1
 The consideration belonged to the Malay leaders who were responsible for the decision of its 
expulsion. 
2
 The authors of this article comment upon the fact that Singapore tried to render as many beneficial 
outcomes as possible, from the break from the affiliation with Malaysia; Indeed, the legislative British 
inheritance could be easily seized in the formalities of the constitutional assemblage that Singapore 
introduced in the first years of statehood; This legislative framing was aiming to accommodate and 
shelter the Asian Values to which Singapore`s leaders have shown adherence.  
3
 Within the same exchange of influences that India, Malaysia or even Myanmar have gone through 
as colonies of the British Empire. 
4
 For instance, he can make judiciary appointments.  
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designation is given by the President and their legislature is shorter: only two and a 
half years, compared to the longer period of the members of the parliament that are 
elected by popular suffrage, who enjoy a five-full-year term in office. Even from 
the beginning of the shaky independence years, in Singapore, the rife political 
power has been concentrated in the hands of the People`s Action Party1.  
The People’s Action Party’s trajectory to total laterality and political monopole is 
owed to the political eminence of Lee Kuan Yew. In 1959, Lee became 
Singapore’s first prime-minister. His period in office totaled three decades2. He is 
affectionately addressed in public speeches, and even in the scientific literature, as 
the father of the modern state of Singapore3. He made Singapore politics a 
patriarchal vault where the People’s Action Party could write the cenotaph 
principles and informal norms. Allegations of manipulations and electoral fraud are 
all too present in the history of the People’s Action Party. Some may say that its 
existence is, actually, due to them. The question posed is: how else could the 
political rotation to power, be so severely held in contempt by it?  
The People’s Action Party (PAP) was the only one to produce the influential 
figures for the position of prime-minister and for the most important ministerial 
positions in Singapore. It is also responsible for the self-assured and bold character 
of Singapore’s foreign policy. In addition to this, it has achieved that by creating a 
sway of containing of the military sector by the civilian leadership, as compared to 
its neighbors in Southeast Asia, Myanmar being a noteworthy example, in this 
case4. In foreign policy terms, Singapore views the global arena as a place of 
concentration, composed of selfish, interest-absorbed actors. Competition persists 
                                                    
1
 There are other political parties on the political scene: The Worker`s Party, The Singapore 
Democratic Party, The Singapore Democratic Alliance; Their slate was drawn as acceptable in order 
to show out political diversity; As far as their political relevance goes, we can actually characterize it 
as valueless.  
2
 Goh Chok Tong would become Singapore`s second prime-minister in 1990. 
3
 The need for political symbols is a constant aspect in Southeast Asia; The same showing of regard 
was given to Malaysia`s Mohamad Mahathir, for instance. 
4
 The preside of civilian elements over the military sector is now declared to be enhancing, in 
Myanmar, too; Nonetheless, this is viewed to be happening with baby steps; The dismissal of the 
military junta from the reins of power is not a totally successful process, as the remotion left some 
personalities of the old regime not totally out of the lustering of political influence. 
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with engrossment and Singapore has to be resourceful enough in order to be in line 
with the requirements of the competition1! 
In domestic foreign policy, the focus-factor of the PAP has been streamlined by 
restraining civil rights and liberties, more often than not, under the umbrella of 
communitarianism. For instance, Singapore`s Internal Security Act of 19852 
makes, under blatant specifications, clear the following facts: 
“The Minister may, if he considers it in the national interest to do so, by order 
prohibit the manufacture, sale, use, wearing, display or possession of any flag, 
banner, badge, emblem, device, uniform or distinctive dress or any part thereof” 
(Art.7.(1)3); 
or: “Where it appears to the Minister charged with the responsibility for printing 
presses and publications that any document or publication: 
a) contains any incitement to violence; 
b) counsels disobedience to the law or to any lawful order; 
c) is calculated or likely to lead to a breach of the peace, or to promote 
feelings of hostility between different races or classes of the population; or 
d) is prejudicial to the national interest, public order or security of 
Singapore” (Art.20. (1)”4. 
The authorianism rating in Singapore is very high. The excerpts introduced above 
are only some examples of the infringement of human rights and liberties that were 
carried on by the PAP, with the compulsion of legislation. 
We can freely use the remark that Singapoe has one of the highest rates of 
execution in the world1. Between the time frame of 1972-1988, Singapore acquired 
                                                    
1
 The author thinks that the fight for survival no longer stands in explaining Singapore`s foreign 
policy; Moreover, it is the fight for statehood solidity that has replaced the fight for statehood 
converging that the PAP has realized for Singapore during the formative period of the state`s identity. 
2
 Within the revised formulations of 1987.   
3
 Article 7. (1), Chapter I, Part II, Internal Security Act, 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3A5ba26ddb-fd4c-
4e2e-8071-
478c08941758%20Depth%3A0%20ValidTime%3A18%2F06%2F2013%20TransactionTime%3A18
%2F06%2F2013%20Status%3Ainforce;rec=0;whole=yes, Accessed on 18th of May 2013, 14:45 p.m. 
4
 Article 20.(1), Part II, Chapter III, accessed at: 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3A5ba26ddb-fd4c-
4e2e-8071-
478c08941758%20Depth%3A0%20ValidTime%3A18%2F06%2F2013%20TransactionTime%3A18
%2F06%2F2013%20Status%3Ainforce;rec=0;whole=yes, Accessed on 18th of May 2013, 16:45 p.m. 
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an average 4.652 points, by the measurements taken, within the Civil Liberties 
Index of the Freedom House3. All media is controlled by the state. Human rights 
and civil liberties are crippled by the interference of organic laws which hint at the 
wider perspective of the Singapore`s society welfarism4, in order to explain their 
restrictions. The means of association do not inclose plural forms5. 
The PAP renders protective armor for the people of Singapore, but, at the same 
time, it applies principles of the Asian Values, only in their mythological tenure. 
An authentic conversation with the human rights record is not passed by a legal 
denunciation, nor by the public determining acts of perception of the ruling party. 
The biggest and most important contortion from the Asian Values is that the 
priority hierarchy, which places the voice of the people on the highest echelon, is 
turned aside from. Singapore`s model of democracy is, in fact, a melange of 
miscallanea elements, which profess ground tones of heteregenous ranging: the 
stress-mark on the Asian Values and the err and veer of how these values are 
politicized and legislated, technocratic professionalism in the public service6, the 
socialist ideology of the PAP, the acceptance of informality in the public media of 
interactions7. The PAP`s ideology is a socialist one and the predilect structural and 
formal agency is Leninist in essence. However, the PAP has syndicated the 
domestic interior for progress, for economic reform, by providing enough 
entailings to represent a hybrid economic force: not so much capitalist as the 
countries in the Western hemisphere, yet not so socialist in application that it can 
                                                                                                                                   
1
 In some estimation, it is believed that Singapore actually has the highest rate of execution of all the 
countries in the world.  
2
 In the measurements taken, 1 meaning the strongest indicator and 7 the weakest. 
3
 According to the data provided by: http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Singapore/indicator-
civil_liberties/, Accessed on 9th of June 2013, 12:34 p.m. 
4
 A concept that would, theoretically, designate the employment of collective benefits, so that 
everyone can feel and ripe the benefits of communitarism; The profit and prosperity for all, which is 
what this concept is directed at realizing, cumbers freedom of speech, as an act of necessity; 
Criticisms against the government suffer from public exposure; The Asian Values do not make the 
placing of limits on people`s power of expression a conceptual kernel. 
5
 There is only one associative organization – which militates for the rights of all the trade unions in 
Singapore – which is, unfortunately, controlled by the state. 
6
 Meritocracy and professional advance by meritocracy are promoted; Some captious judgments may 
hint to the fact that corruption plagues the insertion of this criteria and also the actual abidance to 
them.  
7
 We are consigning the use of informal dealings in day-to-day occurrences – a dwelling relation point 
with other Southeast Asian states. In Singapore, they are accepted only as long as they do not 
intermeddle with the consensus that, the state may intervene, when it considers necessary, even in 
these substances. 
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abbreviate private economic enterprise. One of the best description of the kind of 
capitalism that Singapore`s model of democracy has created is summed up here: 
“Asian Capitalism appears be more hegemonic than Asian Democracy1. Asian 
Democracy did not succeed in de-legitimising counter-authoritarian (democratic) 
values; it only succeeded in postponing their realisation. Asian Capitalism, on the 
other hand, successful renders counter-capitalistic ideologies (welfarism) as 
unthinkable and undesirable”. (Soek-Fang, 2001, pp. 45-66) 
Despite the fact that, after the Asian Financial Crisis of 19972, the Asian Values 
of the newly industrialized countries (NIC) of the Asian continent3, lost the 
positive condescension of the rest of the world, Singapore was able to quickly 
bounce back and regain its status of a Tiger Economy. The misconfiguration 
between Asian Capitalism and Asian Democracy still leaves Singapore`s 
practically unresponsive to the need of resolving this paralellism4 and for the need 
of gap-bridging measures. 
 
Concluding Inferences 
Singapore`s model of democracy had used the Asian Values as a launching pad, 
yet it has produced else results in their application. How could Singapore have 
achieved something so divergent from the hypotethical conditions from which the 
approach wandered from? The answer is that, just like in other cases, it all comes 
down to the gutter and the narrows used in the fruition. Singapore is a country born 
                                                    
1
 The concepts in italics are of the author`s choosing; They did not appear in this manner in the 
original text. 
2
 The Asian Financial Crisis was one of Asia`s most conspicuous events; It checked off the 
downgrading of what was called the Asian Miracle – which meant the economic ascendancy in the 
global arena of some Asian economies; Speculative attacks on the Thai baht, quickly grew in rank 
and comprised all of Southeast Asia and South Korea in Northeast Asia; The crisis showed that the 
parochial organization of the regional business sector, with evidences of favoritism, patriarchal forms 
of engagement, business-planning and incessant corruption, could not foster prosperity for too long; 
Another very important upshot of the crisis was that it paved the way for the Western criticism that 
capitalism can grow vigorously only in un-authoritarian regimes; The International Monetary Fund 
had to intervene with a series of bailout plans, which imposed heavy-handed measures in the region. 
In Southeast Asia, before the crisis, the economies that were thought to have the most success were 
given the nominal recommendation of tiger economies; Singapore was a tiger economy and 
registered one of the smallest numbers of failures during the crisis. 
3
 An appellation which comprised: South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. 
4
 By this, we mean the lack of concurrence between Singapore`s model of capitalism and its model of 
democracy.  
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out of an intuitive understanding of its weaknesses – whether ethnic, civilizational, 
domestic, regional or geostrategic. Fear was not only a general atmoshphere, but 
also an active experience. The hue and timber of this feeling did not smoothen over 
time. If one is optimist, he can say that the feeling, by and large, stood in a 
resemblant state. If one likes to coat in the negative aspects also, she can say that 
time has gone by for the worst1. 
Singapore`s model of democracy and Singapore`s model of capitalism developed 
in discrepancy, with the latter being given more space for filing its own specificity. 
Singapore was, in several occasions, called in as an example as far as its model of 
capitalism was concerned and given very bad reviews as far as its interpretation of 
Asian Values went. Even during the Asian Financial Crisis, Singapore was in the 
position to publicly countersign the measures taken by the International Monetary 
Fund in South East Asia, much to the rebuttal of other Southeast Asian countries. 
If one can ask the eonian question: which comes first democracy or capitalism? 
which is the primordial cause of the other? - in the case of Singapore, there is no 
definite answer. The Singapore’s democracy model strives in its hibridity – it is 
mightily autocratic, yet it claims the soft Confucianist values of collective 
emancipation and social cohesion. By way of addition, it has some extraneous 
elements, compared to the economic model of capitalism, which Singapore also 
label-made, as it is not conceived within the same relative looseness.  
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